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NOTES
FAIR TRADE AND THE STATE CONSTITUTIONSA NEW TREND
The proponents of resale price maintenance will mark the years
1955 and 1956 as a period of major setbacks. The past two years have
seen the highest courts of eight states' invalidate state Fair Trade laws.
The rapid development of this trend is surprising in view of the fact
that prior to 1949, the constitutionality of such legislation under the
state constitutions had been upheld by every state court in which it
was attacked, and was widely regarded as a settled proposition. 2
Much has been written explaining, 3 defending, 4 and condemning5
the concept of Fair Trade, and no attempt will be made here to re6
construct the numerous discussions concerning the economic wisdom
of the institution. However, constitutional decisions are not resolved
in a vacuum, apart from social, political, and economic situations.
Some notice must, therefore, be taken of the flood of criticism directed
at Fair Trade from diverse sources, and of the possibility that the
influence of such criticism upon judicial thinking has been even more
profound than the recent opinions indicate.
Fair Trade statutes permit contracts between manufacturers of
trademarked or branded commodities, and retailers, by which the
7
latter bind themselves not to sell below a certain stipulated price;
no one may sell or offer to sell the item below this price, whether or
not such person is a party to the contract. 8 The latter feature, the
1. Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Louisiana, Nebraska, Oregon, Virginia,

Utah. The courts of Florida and Michigan had previously taken similar action.
2. "[Ihf no aid can be expected from the courts, any opponent of these
acts must devote his attention to the wisdom of the legislatures in passing
the acts." Rose, Resale Price Maintenance, 3 VAmD. L. REv. 24, 37 (1949).
3. See, e.g., WEIGEL, THE FAIR TRADE ACTS (1938).
4. See, e.g., Breighner, Why Fair Trade Is Fair,34 MIcH. ST. B.J. 40 (1955).
5. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 2.
6. An example of one of the more common criticisms is the following statement: "An effective 'Fair Trade' system, moreover, strikes not only at promo-

tional price cutting, but at all price reductions which pass to the consumer
the economies of competitive distribution." REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL's

NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTI-TRUST LAWS 53 (1955); U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2185-94 (1952).
7. For typical statutory provisions, see CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE ANN. § 16902

(Deering 1951).
8. 'Vilfully and knowingly advertising, offering for sale or selling any
commodity at less than the price stipulated in any contract entered into pursuant to this chapter, whether the person so advertising, offering for sale or
selling is or is not a party to such contract, is unfair competition and is actionable at the suit of any person damaged thereby. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE ANN. §

16904 (Deering 1951).
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controversial nonsigner provision, is the backbone of resale price
maintenance, 9 and is the provision which has occasioned most of the
condemnation visited on Fair Trade.
FAILURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL ATTAcKs

Early State and FederalDecisions
California passed a Fair Trade Act in 1931 and amended it in 1933
to include a nonsigner provision. By the end of 1936, 14 states
had passed such laws. During that year, the Court of Appeals of
New York struck down the Fair Trade law of that state in a case
involving a nonsigner. 10 However, the New York court soon overruled this case 1 on the authority of the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Old DearbornDistributorsCo. v. Seagram Distillers
Corp.,12 in which the court disposed of any "due process" and "equal
protection" objections against Fair Trade laws arising under the
Federal Constitution. The Supreme Courts of California and Illinois
also had occasion to pass on the validity of the Fair Trade Acts in 1936.
Both courts upheld the acts13 as a reasonable exercise of the state
police power, relying on the broad scope of this power authorized by
the Supreme Court in Nebbia v. New York. 14 These cases illustrate
a refusal to quarrel with economic policies of the legislature.
Acceptance of the Trademark Theory
Along with the Supreme Court in the Old Dearborn case, the high
courts of Illinois and California placed their stamp of approval on the
so-called "trademark" theory. This principle is an attempt to answer
the fundamental constitutional objection to the Fair Trade scheme,
which stems from the fact that an individual may acquire unconditional title to goods and still be restricted in disposing of them, by the
terms of a contract to which he was not a party. No standards are set
to govern the price set by the contract, and once made, it binds all
others who may acquire goods bearing the trademark. Nor is there
any right of appeal to any agency from the price set by the contract.
9. "This 'non-signer' clause is the heart of the statutory scheme. Without
it, fair-trade contracts would be practically worthless, since distributors who

want to cut prices would never sign a price maintenance contract." Fulda,
Resale Price Maintenance in the United States, 3 Bus. L. REv. 66 (1956).
10. Doubleday, Doran & Co. v. R. H. Macy & Co., 269 N.Y. 272, 199 N.E. 409

(1936). The court held this measure to be for price fixing, a purpose which
the legislature could not accomplish directly or indirectly.
11. Bourjois Sales Corp. v. Dorfman, 273 N.Y. 167, 7 N.E.2d 30 (1937).
12. 299 U.S. 183 (1936).

13. Max Factor & Co. v. Kunsman, 5 Cal. 2d 446, 55 P.2d 177 (1936); Joseph
Triner Corp. v. McNeil, 363 Ill. 559, 2 N.E.2d 929 (1936).
14. 291 U.S. 502 (1934). This case torpedoed the theory that the state police
power is limited to the protection of the public life, safety, health, and morals,
and held that there is no closed class or category of businesses affected with
a public interest.
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What is it that justifies subjecting a party to the terms of an agreement
he never made? It is argued that the goodwill attached to the manufacturer's trademark follows the trademarked goods into the hands
of a purchaser. Consequently, even though having no title to the goods
themselves, the manufacturer continues to possess a valuable property
interest in the trademark, which the legislature, in the exercise of its
police power, may reasonably protect from price cutting by appropriate restrictions. 15 Thus, it was said in the Old Dearborncase that
the restriction "ran with the acquisition and conditioned it. '16 This is
the professed purpose of the Fair Trade laws.
The Miller-Tydings Act of 193717 was designed to obviate the possibility that state fair trade acts would be invalidated for conflicting
with the Sherman Act. 18 Following this permissive legislation by Congress, the number of Fair Trade states climbed to 45.19
Influence of the Old DearbornCase
The Old Dearborn case having disposed of objections under the
Federal Constitution, the state courts refused to find merit in similar
objections under the state constitutions. In Goldsmith v. Mead Johnson & Co.20 the high court of Maryland said, "In construing this article
of the Declaration of Rights, the decisions of the Supreme Court on the
Fourteenth Amendment are 'practically direct authorities.' "21 The
persistent refusal to re-examine legislative determinations in economic
matters, which has characterized the decisions sustaining Fair Trade
laws, was illustrated when the validity of the statute was again at issue
before the Maryland court in 1956.22 The contentions were made that
economic conditions had changed, and furthermore experience had
demonstrated that Fair Trade legislation had not accomplished the
intended purpose. These suggestions were met with a refusal to overturn legislative policies in the absence of a showing that they were so
clearly unsound economically as to have no reasonable basis to support them.
Maryland was joined by many states, including New Jersey,2 3 Wis15. This theory has been criticized as a fiction utilized to disguise a Dolicv of
relieving retailers from the rigors of price competition. Shulman. The Fair
Trade Acts, and the Law of Restrictive Agreements Affecting Chattels, 49
YALE L.J. 607 (1940).
16. 299 U.S. at 194.
17. 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1948).
18. In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). the
Supreme Court had held that a contract by which a manufacturer fixed the
resale price of items which he sold to retailers was in restraint of trade.
19. Missouri, Texas, and Vermont, have not enacted Fair Trade statutes.
20. 176 Md. 682, 7 A.2d 176 (1939).
21. 7 A.2d at 178.
22. Home Utilities Co. v. Revere Copper and Brass; Inc., 122 A.2d 109 (Md.
1956).
23. Lionel Corp. v. Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc., 15 N.J. 191, 104 A.2d
304 (1954); Johnson & Johnson v. Charmley Drug Co., 11 N.J. 526, 95 A.2d 391
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consin,24 Connecticut, 25 Delaware,2 6 and Massachusetts,

27

in applying

Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Federal Constitution to
questions involving state constitutions. When the California court
reaffirmed its position,28 the previous independently made decision was
bolstered by federal authorities. 29
In sustaining the validity of the North Carolina act, the supreme
court of that state pointed out that restrictions on the use which an
individual makes of his property are not uncommon, and found no
reason for placing resale price restrictions on a different footing from
other types of regulation. 30
The courts of South Dakota and Washington had occasion to consider the effect of constitutional anti-monopoly clauses upon resale
price maintenance. Both courts held that Fair Trade acts did not
produce a restraint on competition sufficient to constitute a violation
31
of these provisions.
Other courts 32 joined the ranks of those refusing to strike Fair Trade,

with the Supreme Court of Tennessee, in effect, denying the existence
33
of constitutional problems in this field.

Criticismof FairTrade
The unanimity of the courts during this period did not, of course,
reflect the state of opinion elsewhere. Among legal writers, economists,
businessmen, political figures, newspaper editors and the public at
large, resale price maintenance had vigorous critics. The restriction of
competition at the level of distribution, with the resultant higher
prices to consumers, the difficulty of equitable enforcement, and the
(1953); Johnson & Johnson v. Weissbard, 121 N.J. Eq. 585, 191 AUt. 873 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1937).
24. Bulova Watch Co. v. Anderson, 270 Wis. 21, 70 N.W.2d 243 (1955); Weco
Products Co. v. Reed Drug Co., 225 Wis. 474, 274 N.W. 426 (1937).
25. Burroughs Wellcome & Co. v. Johnson W. Perfume Co., 128 Conn. 596,
24 A.2d 841 (1942).
26. General Electric Co. v. Klein, 106 A.2d 206 (Del. 1954).
27. General Electric Co. v. Kimball Jewelers, Inc., 132 N.E.2d 652 (Mass.
1956).

28. See note 13 supra.

29. Scovill Mfg. Co. v. Skaggs Pay Less Drug Stores, 45 Cal. 2d 881, 291
P.2d 936 (1955).
30. Ely Lilly & Co. v. Saunders, 216 N.C. 163, 4 S.E.2d 528 (1939).
31. Miles Laboratories, Inc., v. Owl Drug Co., 67 S.D. 523, 295 N.W. 292
(1940); Sears v. Western Thrift Stores, Inc., 10 Wash. 2d 372, 116 P.2d 756
(1941).
32. W.A. Schaeffer Pen Co. v. Barrett, 209 Miss. 1. 45 So. 2d 838 (1950);
Burche Co. v. General Electric Co., 382 Pa. 370, 115 A.2d 361 (1955). The
New York court has repeated its holding in Bourjois Sales Corp. v. Dorfman,
273 N.Y. 167, 7 N.E.2d 30 (1937) in: General Electric Co. v. Masters, Inc., 307
N.Y. 229, 120 N.E.2d 802 (1954); Bristol-Myers Co. v. Picker, 302 N.Y. 61, 96
N.E.2d 177 (1950); Calamia v. Goldsmith Bros., 299 N.Y. 636, 87 N.E.2d 50
(1949); Guerlin, Inc. v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 297 N.Y. 101, 22 N.E.2d 253 (1939);
Port Chester Wine & Liquor Shop v. Miller Bros. Fruiterers, Inc., 281 N.Y.
101, 22 N.E.2d 253 (1939).
33. Frankfort Distillers Corp. v. Liberto, 190 Tenn. 478, 230 S.W.2d 971
(1950).
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were
interference with the individual retailer's freedom of action
34
among the weaknesses cited by the opponents of the measure.
A committee of economists, law professors, and attorneys, formed
by the Attorney General in 1953 for the purpose of studying the antitrust laws, advocated the repeal of "Fair Trade" legislation.5 While
admitting the necessity for protecting legitimate commercial aims,
the committee did not consider "Fair Trade" a proper means of protecting these interests. It was criticized as restrictive of competition,
unfavorable to the consumer, and at war with the basic philosophy
df the anti-trust laws.
The influence of the Federal Trade Commission, the Justice Department, and various business, consumer, farm and labor organizations 36
could not indefinitely fail to be reflected in the attitudes of the courts.
The United States Supreme Court, in the 1951 case of Schwegmann
Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp.,37 held that the Miller-Tidings Act did

not exempt the nonsigner provisions of state laws from the operation
of the Sherman Act.38 The Court did not hold Fair Trade acts unconstitutional and, in fact, it declined to do so after Congress, by passing the
McGuire Act, 39 authorized nonsigner clauses. However, the refusal to
favor the "Fair Trade" concept by a broader construction of the MillerTydings Act seems indicative of some permeation of judicial consciousness by the repeated criticisms of the scheme which emanated from
so many and such widely respected quarters.
RECENT SUCCESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL ATTACKS

The first clear defeat of Fair Trade legislation had occurred earlier
in Florida, where in 1949 that state's Fair Trade law was held repugnant to the state constitution. In the case of Liquor Store, Inc. v.
Continental Distilling Corp.,40 the court found that the general wel34. Rose, Resale Price Maintenance,3 VAND. L. REV. 24 (1949).
35. See note 6 supra.
36. For a list of some proponents and opponents of Fair Trade, see U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2184 (1952).

37. 341 U.S. 384 (1951). For a discussion of this case, see Rahl, Resale Price

Maintenance,State Action, and the Anti-trust Laws, 46 ILL. L. REv. 349 (1951).
38. After the Schwegmann decision and before passage of the McGuire. Act,
the Supreme Court of Minnesota held the nonsigner provisions of the Minnesota law invalid as beyond the authority given the states by the Miller-Tydings
Act. Calvert Distillers Corp. v. Sachs, 234 Minn. 303, 48 N.W.2d 531 (1951).
After the passage of the McGuire Act, the state attorney general ruled that the
nonsigner provisions of the state act were still in force. Opinion of the
Attorney General of the State of Minnesota, December 10, 1952, 1952-53

Trade Cas. 167,391.
39. 66 STAT. 632 (1952), 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (Supp. 1956). This act was held
not to violate the Federal Constitution in Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super
Markets v. Eli Lilly & Co., 205 F.2d 788 (1953), cert. denied,. 346 U.S. 856
(1953). The McGuire-Act seems safe from attack in the United States Supreme
Court. Note, 16 U. Prx. L. REV. 50 (1954).

40. 40 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1949). Ten years earlier, the court had struck the
nonsigner provisions of the act because of a technical defect in the title.
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fare would not be served by upholding such an exercise of the state's
police power. It was held that the legislature had delegated sovereign
power to private parties for a private purpose. The Florida legislature,
in the hope of convincing the judicial branch that a reasonable basis
existed for this type of regulatory act, amended the statute so as to
incorporate findings of fact to justify its passage. Subsequently, the
court affirmed, in a brief opinion, the action of a trial court which had
41
looked behind these findings of fact and found them wanting.
Further condemnation was heaped upon the scheme in the 1954
case of Miles Laboratories,Inc. v. Eckerd.42 Provision for some administrative supervision by the attorney general,43 which had been written
into the Act in 1953, was found to be a meager remedy for the absence
of a yard stick standard to control an inherent limitation of property
rights.
Instead of discussing the statute with a view to the requirement of
particular portions of the state constitution, the court approached the
problem in these cases by inquiring into the extent of the police power
of the state. The absence of standards to control the operation of the
system and the fact that the welfare being protected was limited
rather than general, resulted in a declaration that the statute went
beyond the limits of this police power. This approach seems to deal
in very broad and somewhat vague constitutional principles, permitting more freedom for the application of judicial policy.
The Florida decisions started a trend which Michigan joined in 1952,
and which recently has progressed so rapidly that the courts of ten
44
states have now invalidated Fair Trade statutes.
Use of the Due ProcessConcepts
"Due process" was the constitutional implement utilized by the
high courts of Michigan, 45 Georgia, 46 Arkansas, 47 Nebraska, 48 and
Bristol-Myers Co. v. Webb's Cut Rate Drug Co., 137 Fla. 508, 188 So. 91
(1939). However, after the correction of this defect, the law had been upheld
in Scarborough v. Webb's Cut Rate Drug Co., 150 Fla. 845, 8 So. 2d 913
(1942). This case could not be regarded as a clear approval of Fair Trade,
although the holding was practically supported by reference to the Old
Dearborn case, because it involved the liquor industry and emphasis was laid
on special regulatory power over this type of business.
41. Seagram-Distillers Corp. v. Ben Greene, Inc., 54 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 1951).
42. 73 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 1954).

43., The attorney general was authorized to bring an action to restrain the
performance or enforcement of any contract if it seemed to prevent competition .between similar commodities. Id. at 682.
44. See note 1 supra.
45. Shakespeare Co. v. Lippman's Tool Shop Sporting Goods Co., 334 Mich.
109, 54 N.W.2d 268 (1952).

46. Cox v. General Electric Co., 211 Ga. 286, 85 S.E.2d 514 (1955).
47. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. White River Distributors, Inc., 224

Ark. 558, 275 S.W.2d 455 (1955).

48. McGraw Electric Co. v. Lewis & Smith Drug Co., 159 Neb. 703, 68

N.W.2d 608 (1955).
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Colorado 49 to invalidate their Fair Trade Legislation.
The controlling question, in the judgment of the Michigan court, was
whether reducing prices brings evils on the public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare. The court found no reasonable relation
between the protection of these interests and the purpose of the statute.
The proposition that the legislature may protect the manufacturer's
trademark rights, which was accepted by the United States Supreme
Court in the Old Dearborn case, and by numerous state courts, was not
directly contradicted in the Michigan opinion. The court preferred to
find that there had been no violation of the plaintiff's trademark rights
by a sale below the Fair Trade price. Support for the holding was
drawn from the Liquor Store decision of the Florida court, and from
a previous Michigan case 50 holding that a statute forbidding the giving
of premiums with the sale of gasoline accomplished a denial of due
process of law.
In a 1953 case, which held the Georgia Fair Trade Act void ab initio
because it had conflicted with the Sherman Act at the time of its passage (and had not been validated by repassage after Congress removed
the conflict), the Georgia Supreme Court raised by way of dictum due
process objections to the statute. 51 After repassage of the act, the dictum matured into a square holding in 1955 that the statute violated
52
the due process clause of the Georgia Constitution.
The court utilized a prior holding, 53 that a State Milk Control Board
could not be given authority to fix the selling price of milk, as a springboard for its approach to the problem. The legislature was held to lack
power to fix prices or to authorize others to do so except concerning
certain property affected with a public interest. Apparently, the
Georgia court was unready to accept the Nebbia doctrine of a broadened police power not confined to regulation of limited types of
54
activities having a unique relation to the public welfare.
A Fair Trade Act also fell before the due process clause of the
Arkansas Constitution. In the case of Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v.
White River Distributors,Inc.55 the act was found to have failed to
meet due process requirements because it could not be characterized
as benefitting the general welfare and therefore was not a reasonable
exercise of the state police power.
The court described the "pivotal issue" as whether or not there
had been an abuse of the police power, which seemed to broaden the
49. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. v. Francis, 301 P.2d 139 (Colo. 1950).
50. People v. Victor, 287 Mich. 506, 283 N.W. 666 (1939).

51. Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc. v. Oneida, Ltd., 209 Ga. 613, 75 S.E.2d
161 (1953).
52. See note 46 supra.
53. Harris v. Duncan, 208 Ga. 561, 67 S.E.2d 692 (1951).
54. See note 14 supra.
55. See note 47 supra.
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inquiry into the due process question, rather than narrow its scope and
reduce the controversy to more specific matters.
In addition to the due process grounds previously employed by other
state courts, the Supreme Court of Nebraska declared Fair Trade Acts
unconstitutional in that state because it was found to grant special
privileges and immunities to certain persons and withhold these rights
56
from others.
The grant of power to individuals to fix and enforce the prices of
merchandise, without the imposition of any standards (previously
criticized by the Florida court), was found in this case to be particularly obnoxious to the concept of due process of law.
The Supreme Court of Colorado, in finding that Fair Trade Laws7
failed to meet due process requirements of the state constitution,
emphasized the importance of the property rights which were being
compromised without due process of law. The right to deal with
property to which an individual has received unconditional title, and
to contract freely with respect to such goods, was held to be beyond
the reach of the police power in such a situation as this. The court
went further, and stated that "Fair Trade" tends to promote monopoly
and stifle trade,58 thus contradicting the obvious legislative factual
determinations motivating the passage of the statute. This portion of
the opinion seems to reveal a hostility to "Fair Trade" based on a feeling of its economic unsoundness, which may well reflect the influence
of the general criticism previously noted.
Unlawful Delegationof Legislative Power
In the -case of General Electric Co. v. Wahle, 9 the Oregon Fair Trade
-Statute was struck down as an unnecessary and unreasonable interference with contract and property rights, and a delegation of legislative power to private persons in specific violation of the Oregon Constitution.6 0 The Oregon court showed its uneasiness in regard to the
unrestrained power given to manufacturers of trademarked items in
the foll6wing terms: "Under the Fair Trade Act authority is delegated
tathe owner of a trademarked commodity to determine whether the
provisions of the law shall be put into effect and operation as to such
commodity. .

.

. By his own act in entering into a contract with a

single retailer, the trademark owner may fix the price for all retailers.
56. See note 48 supra.
57. See note 49 supra.

58. "The contract in the instant case . . . if enforced . . . inevitably will
result in monopoly." Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. v. Francis, 301 P.2d 139,
147 (Colo. 1950).

59. 296 P.2d 635 (Ore. 1956).
60. "[N]or shall any law be passed, the taking effect of which shall be
made to depend on any authority, except as provided in this Constitution .
ORE. CONST. art. 1, § 21 (1859).
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Without regard to the interests or welfare of the nonsigners, and without their consent, he may change the price at will ... ,,61 The Louisiana
Supreme Court recently invalidated resale price maintenance on similar grounds.6
Repeal by Implication
Fair Trade received a setback in Virginia, but not because of a
conflict with the state constitution. The legislature had re-enacted
that state's Anti-monopoly Act in 1950, and it defined a monopoly as
a combination of acts by two or more persons "... (5) to make.., or
carry out contracts . . .or agreements of any kind or description by
which they: (a) bind.., themselves not to sell.., any commodity...
below a ... fixed value ....-63 The re-enactment of this statute was
held by the Virginia Supreme Court to have repealed the state Fair
Trade Act,6 because of the irreconcilable conflict between the two. 65
ConstitutionalAnti-monopoly Clause
The Constitution of Utah, which forbids "any combination.., having
for its object or effect the controlling of the price .. .of any article
or manufacture or commerce . . . ." provided the supreme court of
that state with a firm basis for striking down resale price maintenance.6
CONCLUSION
Although some recent cases6 7 have upheld Fair Trade Laws, the birth
and growth of a trend in the opposite direction has been almost sensational. As late as 1949, the numerous state courts which had passed
on the constitutionality of these statutes chose to stand in the long
shadow of the Supreme Court's Old Dearborn decision. Now that the
courts of nine states have invalidated Fair Trade Acts and one found
a repeal by implication, it seems safe to predict that the constitutional
issue will soon be brought before the courts of the seventeen odd
states 68 who have not yet decided it. 69 Then too, a reversal by some of
those seventeen courts which have sustained the scheme is not impossible.
61. 296 P.2d at 648.
62. Dr. G. H. Tichenor Antiseptic Co. v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super
Markets, 90 So. 2d 343 (La. 1956).
63. VA. CODE ANN. § 59-20 (1950).
64. Benrus Watch Co. v. Kirsch, 198 Va. 94, 92 S.E.2d 384 (1956).
65. For a discussion of implied repeals, see SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CON-

smucTmON §§ 2011-12 (1943).

66. General Electric Co. v. Thrifty Sales, Inc., 5 Utah 326, 301 P.2d 741 (1956).
67. General Electric Co. v. Klein, 106 A.2d 206 (Del. 1954). See also note 22
supra.
68. Alabama, Arizona, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine,
Montana, Nevada. New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
69. Trial court decisions in three of these states have recently held resale
price maintenance laws violative of state constitutions. Bargain Barn, Inc.
v. Arvin, 1955 Trade Cas. f[68,074 (Ind. Super. Ct. 1955); General Electric

Co. v. American Buyers Cooperative, Inc., CCH

TRADE REG. REP. (1956 Trade
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The most basic difference between the cases which invalidate Fair
Trade Acts and those which do not, arises from differing views as
to the relative functions of court and legislature where economic matters are concerned. The "hands off" approach, followed by the United
States Supreme Court since 1937,70 resulted in the unanimous approval
of Fair Trade Legislation by the state courts until 1949. This position
was the culmination of a long history of judicial interference with
71
legislative attempts to deal with pressing economic problems.
A hasty retreat 72 from the practice of second guessing the legislative branch, soon led to the point where the Supreme Court was
reluctant to question state and federal regulation of business affairs. A
few state courts did refuse to follow this trend in regard to price fixing
statutes. 7 3 However, the pre-1949 history of the Fair Trade acts demonstrated the safety of economic regulatory measures from constitutional
attack at that time.
The New Willingness To Look Behind Economic Measures
The disappearance of the depression-born pressure on the courts to
refrain from tampering with regulatory laws has occasioned a willingness to subject measures such as resale price maintenance to more
thorough scrutiny. Unfortunately, in many cases, the standards used
to decide constitutionality have been very indefinite. While constitutional standards are necessarily of a general nature, it is difficult to
see how a discussion of the extent of the state "police power" would
be helpful for any purpose other than to disguise a pure policy decision.
A realistic approach to the problem must recognize the existence of
valid conflicting interests. Evaluating a regulatory statute by weighing
the harm to be remedied against the harm incidental to the remedy
itself 74 seems to be a practical way to deal with the problem. In the
Fair Trade situation, this would preclude a holding that the evil
accompanying the nonsigner provisions render them arbitrary and
unreasonable in and of themselves. Such a finding could be made however, after a consideration of the evil to be remedied.
Cas.) fr68,341 (Ky. Cir. Ct. 1956); Rogers-Kent, Inc. v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp., 1955 Trade Cas. ff 68,084 (S.C. County Ct. 1955).
70. Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the States, 34
MINN. L. REv. 91 (1950).
71. "9By giving broad scope to these vague expressions of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the judiciary seized the power to nullify legislative enactments
because the judges found them vicious or silly." Ibid. See also CONSTITUTION
ANNOTATED 974-80 (Corwin ed. 1952).
72. Paulsen, supra note 70, at 94.
73. Id. at 95.
74. "And the guaranty of due process . ..demands . . .that the means
selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be
attained. It results that a regulation valid ...in given circumstances, may be
invalid ... under other circumstances ....
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.
502, 525 (1934).

